- There is a reality that proves the truth of a fact. Because our memory and our senses are too insecure, too partial. We can even say that it is often impossible to discern to what extent a fact that we perceive is real and from what point we only believe that it is. So to preserve reality as such, we need another reality-a reality-that relativize adjoining. But, in turn, this reality requires a base adjacent to relativize itself. That is, there is another fact demonstrating adjacent turn, that this is true. And this chain extends indefinitely into our consciousness and in a certain sense, one can say that it is through this succession, through the conservation of this chain, as we become aware of our existence. But if this chain casually breaks, were baffled. Does the reality is the other side of the link broken? Are you on this side?Hay una realidad que demuestra la verdad de un hecho. Porque nuestra memoria y nuestros sentidos son demasiado inseguros, demasiado parciales. Incluso podemos afirmar que muchas veces es imposible discernir hasta qué punto un hecho que creemos percibir es real y a partir de qué punto sólo creemos que lo es. Así que para preservar la realidad como tal, necesitamos otra realidad -una realidad colindante- que la relativice. Pero, a su vez, esta realidad colindante necesita una base para relativizarse a sí misma. Es decir, que hay otra realidad colindante que demuestra, a su vez, que ésta es real. Y esta cadena se extiende indefinidamente dentro de nuestra conciencia y, en un cierto sentido, puede afirmarse que es a través de esta sucesión, a través de la conservación de esta cadena, como adquirimos conciencia de nuestra existencia misma. Pero si esta cadena, casualmente, se rompe, quedamos desconcertados. ¿La realidad está al otro lado del eslabón roto? ¿Está a este lado?”“Some people walk through a hallway with covered mirrors– the hallway is lined with mirrors but there are blankets covering each of them. They go through life believing in an image of themselves that isn't real, and an image of themselves standing in the world and relative to the world, that isn't real. If you happen to be in that hallway and pull the blankets off the mirrors, they're going to think that you're hurting them; but they're actually just seeing their reflection for the first time. Sometimes the most horrendous thing a person can see, is all the hidden things inside them, the things they've covered, the things they choose not look at. And you're not hurting them, you're setting them free.”“Reality is far more vicious than Russian roulette. First, it delivers the fatal bullet rather infrequently, like a revolver that would have hundreds, even thousands of chambers instead of six. After a few dozen tries, one forgets about the existence of a bullet, under a numbing false sense of security. Second, unlike a well-defined precise game like Russian roulette, where the risks are visible to anyone capable of multiplying and dividing by six, one does not observe the barrel of reality. One is capable of unwittingly playing Russian roulette - and calling it by some alternative “low risk” game.”“[J]ust the sight of this book, even though it was of no authority, made me wonder how it happened that so many different men – and learned men among them – have been and are so inclined to express both in speaking and in their treatises and writings so many wicked insults about women and their behaviour. Not only one or two ... but, more generally, from the treatises of all philosophers and poets and from all the orators – it would take too long to mention their names – it seems that they all speak from one and the same mouth. Thinking deeply about these matters, I began to examine my character and conduct as a natural woman and, similarly, I considered other women whose company I frequently kept, princesses, great ladies, women of the middle and lower classes, who had graciously told me of their most private and intimate thoughts, hoping that I could judge impartially and in good conscience whether the testimony of so many notable men could be true. To the best of my knowledge, no matter how long I confronted or dissected the problem, I could not see or realise how their claims could be true when compared to the natural behaviour and character of women.”“Hip - Someone who knows the score. Someone who understands "jive talk." Someone who is "with it." The expression is not subject to definition because, if you don't "dig" what it means, no one can ever tell you.”“Presque tous les malheurs de la vie viennent des fausses idées que nous avons sur ce qui nous arrive. Connaître à fond les hommes, juger sainement des événements, est donc un grand pas vers le bonheur."("Almost all our misfortunes in life come from the wrong notions we have about the things that happen to us. To know men thoroughly, to judge events sanely, is, therefore, a great step towards happiness.")[Journal entry, 10 December 1801]”Nothing so ageing as giving into preconceived perceptions; the youth within one would not have given in to such stodginess.”― allison malm"the truth in the world" (alethic) and "the truth in an individual's mind" (epistemic)ApodicticityFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, searchLook up apodictic in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.Part of the series on:Logic (Organon):Physics or Natural philosophy:Metaphysics:Ethics and Politics:Rhetoric and Poetics:Spurious Works:"Apodictic" or "apodeictic" (Ancient Greek: "ἀποδεικτικός", "capable of demonstration") is an adjectival expression from Aristotelean logic that refers to propositions that are demonstrable, that are necessarily or self-evidently the case or that, conversely, are impossible. Apodicticity or apodixis is the corresponding abstract noun, referring to logical certainty.Apodictic propositions contrast with assertoric propositions, which merely assert that something is (or is not) the case, and with problematic propositions, which assert only the possibility of something being true. Franz Brentano writes in The True and the Evident, "judgments may be either assertoric or apodictic. Assertoric judgments are judgments which are possibly true but are unproven." Apodictic judgments are judgments which are clearly provable and logically certain. For instance, "Two plus two equals four" is apodictic. "Chicago is larger than Omaha" is assertoric. "A corporation could be wealthier than a country" is problematic. In Aristotelian logic, "apodictic" is opposed to "dialectic," as scientific proof is opposed to probable reasoning. Kant contrasts "apodictic" with "problematic" and "assertoric" in the Critique of Pure Reason, on page A70/B95.The expression "apodictic" is also sometimes applied to a style of argumentation in which a person presents his reasoning as being categorically true, even if it is not necessarily so. An example of such a usage might be: "Demonstrate less apodicticity! You haven't considered several facets of the question."Alethic modalityFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, searchFor the concept in modal logic, see Subjunctive possibility.Alethic modality is a linguistic modality which indicates logical necessity, possibility or impossibility.Alethic modality is often associated with epistemic modality in research. However, it has been questioned whether this modality should be considered distinct from epistemic modality which denotes the speaker's evaluation or judgment of the truth. The criticism states that there is no real difference between "the truth in the world" (alethic) and "the truth in an individual's mind" (epistemic). An investigation has not found a single language in which alethic and epistemic modalities are formally distinguished, as by the means of a grammatical mood. In such a language, "A circle can't be square", "can't be" would be expressed by an alethic mood, whereas for "He can't be that wealthy", "can't be" would be expressed by an epistemic mood. As we can see, this is not a distinction drawn in English grammar."You can't give these plants too much water." is a well-known play on the distinction between this so-called alethic modality and (perhaps hortatory or injunctive) modality. The dilemma is fairly easily resolved when listening through paralinguistic cues and particularly suprasegmental cues (intonation). So while there may not be a morphologically based alethic mood, this does not seem to preclude the usefulness of distinguishing between these two types of modes. Alethic modality might then concern what are considered to be apodictic statements.The Metaphysical DeductionHere Kant aims to derive the twelve pure concepts of the understanding (which he also calls "categories") from the logical forms of judgment. Kant arranges the forms of judgment in a table of judgments, which he uses to guide the derivation of the table of categories.He creates a list of categories by first enumerating the forms of possible objective judgment, which are endowed with their objectivity by virtue of their inherent a priori concepts. Kant claims that if we can identify all of the possible forms of objective judgment, we can then hope to use them as the basis to discover all of the most general concepts or categories that are employed in making such judgments, and thus that are employed in any cognition of objects.Now, the logicians have concerned themselves to ascertain and classify the various possible logical forms of judgments. Kant, accepts and adopts, with one or two modifications, their work as correct and complete, and lays before his reader, accordingly, the following table of the different logical forms of judgment, reduced under four heads:1. Quantity of Judgements2. Quality3. Relation4. ModalityIn each of these ‘moments’ of judgment, there are three alternative classifications;(A70/B95).1. Quantity of JudgementsUniversalParticularSingular2. QualityAffirmativeNegativeInfinite3. RelationCategoricalHypotheticalDisjunctive4. ModalityProblematicAssertoricApodeicticThese Aristotelian ways of classifying judgments are the basis for his discerning the twelve correlated concepts of the understanding. Kant ultimately distinguishes twelve pure concepts of the understanding divided into four classes of three (A80/B106):1. Categories of QuantityUnityPluralityTotality2. Categories of QualityRealityNegationLimitation3. Categories of RelationInherence and Subsistence (substance and accident)Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)4. Categories of ModalityPossibility—ImpossibilityExistence—Non-existenceNecessity—ContingencyThese categories, then, are the fundamental, primary, or native conceptions of the understanding, which flow from, or constitute the mechanism of, its nature, are inseparable from its activity, and are therefore, for human thought, universal and necessary, or a priori. They are not contingent states or images of sensuous consciousness, and hence not to be thence derived, but they are not known to us independently of such consciousness or of sensible experience. On the one hand, they are exclusively involved in, and hence come to our knowledge exclusively through, the spontaneous activity of the understanding, but, on the other hand, the understanding is never active, until sensible data are furnished as material for it to act upon, and so it may truly be said that they become known to us "only on the occasion of sensible experience." For Kant, in opposition to Christian Wolff and Hobbes, the categories exist only in the mind.These categories are "pure" conceptions of the understanding, in as much as they are independent of all that is contingent in sense. They are not derived from what is called the matter of sense, or from particular, variable sensations. However, they are not independent of the universal and necessary form of sense. Again, Kant, in the "Transcendental Logic," is professedly engaged with the search for an answer to the second main question of the Critique, How is pure physical science, or sensible knowledge, possible? Kant, now, has said, and, with reference to the kind of knowledge mentioned in the foregoing question, has said truly, that thoughts, without the content which perception supplies, are empty. This is not less true of pure thoughts, than of any others. The content which the pure conceptions, as categories of pure physical science or sensible knowledge, cannot derive from the matter of sense, they must and do derive from its pure form. And in this relation between the pure conceptions of the understanding and their pure content there is involved, as we shall see, the most intimate community of nature and origin between sense, on its formal side (space and time), and the understanding itself. For Kant, space and time are a priori intuitions. Out of a total of six arguments in favor of space as a priori intuition, Kant presents four of them in the Metaphysical Exposition of space: two argue for space a priori and two for space as intuition.:75Subjunctive possibility and other modalitiesSubjunctive possibility is contrasted with (among other things) epistemic possibility (which deals with how the world may be, for all we know) and deontic possibility (which deals with how the world ought to be).Deontic possibilityThere is some overlap in language between subjunctive possibilities and deontic possibilities: for example, we sometimes use the statement "You can/cannot do that" to express (i) what it is or is not subjunctively possible for you to do, and we sometimes use it to express (ii) what it would or would not be right for you to do. The two are less likely to be confused in ordinary language than subjunctive and epistemic possibility as there are some important differences in the logic of subjunctive modalities and deontic modalities. In particular, subjunctive necessity entails truth: if people logically must such and such, then you can infer that they actually do it. But in this non-ideal world, a deontic ‘must’ does not carry the moral certitude that people morally must do such and such.Jørgensen's DilemmaThis section requires expansion. (June 2008)Deontic logic faces Jørgensen's Dilemma. Norms cannot be true or false, but truth and truth values seem essential to logic. There are two possible answers:Deontic logic handles norm propositions, not norms;There might be alternative concepts to truth, e.g. validity or success, as it is defined in speech act theory.
Norms are concepts (sentences) of practical import, oriented to effecting an action, rather than conceptual abstractions that describe, explain, and express. Normative sentences imply "ought-to" types of statements and assertions, in distinction to sentences that provide "is" types of statements and assertions. Common normative sentences include commands, permissions, and prohibitions; common normative abstract concepts include sincerity, justification, and honesty. A popular account of norms describes them as reasons to take action, to believe, and to feel.
Physical Metaphysics. Peirce held the view, which he called objective idealism, that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws". Peirce asserted the reality of (1) absolute chance (his tychist view), (2) mechanical necessity (anancist view), and (3) that which he called the law of love (agapist view), echoing his categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively. He held that fortuitous variation (which he also called "sporting"), mechanical necessity, and creative love are the three modes of evolution (modes called "tychasm", "anancasm", and "agapasm") of the cosmos and its parts. He found his conception of agapasm embodied in Lamarckian evolution; the overall idea in any case is that of evolution tending toward an end or goal, and it could also be the evolution of a mind or a society; it is the kind of evolution which manifests workings of mind in some general sense. He said that overall he was a synechist, holding with reality of continuity, especially of space, time, and law.Agapism is belief in selfless, charitable, non-erotic (brotherly) love, spiritual love, love of the soul. It can mean belief that such love (or "agape") should be the sole ultimate value and that all other values are derived from it, or that the sole moral imperative is to love. Theological agapism holds that our love of God is expressed by loving each other. As the ethics of love, agapism indicates that we should do the most loving thing in each situation, letting love determine our obligation rather than rules. Alternatively, given a set of rules, agapism indicates to follow those rules which produce the most love.In 1851, the English journalist and social researcher Henry Mayhew, discussing means to "a more general and equal division of the wealth of the country", characterized agapism as "the voluntary sharing of individual possessions with the less fortunate or successful members of the community" and as the alternative to communism ("the abolition of all rights to individual property").
In 1893, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce used the word "agapism" for the view that creative love is operative in the cosmos. Drawing from the Swedenborgian ideas of Henry James, Sr. which he had absorbed long before, Peirce held that it involves a love which expresses itself in a devotion to cherishing and tending to people or things other than oneself, as parent may do for offspring, and as God, as Love, does even and especially for the unloving, whereby the loved ones may learn. Peirce regarded this process as a mode of evolution of the cosmos and its parts, and he called the process "agapasm", such that: "The good result is here brought to pass, first, by the bestowal of spontaneous energy by the parent upon the offspring, and, second, by the disposition of the latter to catch the general idea of those about it and thus to subserve the general purpose." Peirce held that there are three such principles and three associated modes of evolution:
"Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us: evolution by fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution by creative love. We may term them tychastic evolution, or tychasm, anancastic evolution, or anancasm, and agapastic evolution, or agapasm. The doctrines which represent these as severally of principal importance we may term tychasticism, anancasticism, and agapasticism. On the other hand the mere propositions that absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love are severally operative in the cosmos may receive the names of tychism, anancism, and agapism." — C. S. Peirce, 1893
Colorless green ideas sleep furiouslyFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, search
Approximate X-Bar representation of "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously." See phrase structure rules."Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" is a sentence composed by Noam Chomsky in his 1957 Syntactic Structures as an example of a sentence that is grammatically correct, but semantically nonsensical. The term was originally used in his 1955 thesis "Logical Structures of Linguistic Theory". Although the sentence is grammatically correct, no obvious understandable meaning can be derived from it, and thus it demonstrates the distinction between syntax and semantics. As an example of a category mistake, it was used to show inadequacy of the then-popular probabilistic models of grammar, and the need for more structured models.
This 'purposive rational action' is steered by the "media" of the state, which substitute for oral language as the medium of the coordination of social action. An antagonism arises between these two principles of societal integration—language, which is oriented to understanding and collective well being, and "media", which are systems of success-oriented action.Following Weber, Habermas sees specialisation as the key historical development, which leads to the alienating effects of modernity, which 'permeate and fragment everyday consciousness'.Habermas points out that the "sociopsychological costs" of this limited version of rationality are ultimately borne by individuals, which is what György Lukács had in mind when he developed Marx's concept, reification, in his History and Class Consciousness. They surface as widespread neurotic illnesses, addictions, psychosomatic disorders, and behavioural and emotional difficulties; or they find more conscious expression in criminal actions, protest groups and religious cults. Lukács thought that reification, although it runs deep, is constrained by the potential of rational argument to be self-reflexive and transcend its occupational use by oppressive agencies. Habermas agrees with this optimistic analysis, in contrast to Adorno and Horkheimer, and thinks that freedom and ideals of reconciliation are ingrained in the mechanisms of the linguistically mediated sociation of humanity.Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 2Habermas finds in the work of George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) concepts which can be used to free Weber's theory of rationalisation from the aporias of the philosophy of consciousness. Mead's most productive concept is his theoretical base of communication and Durkheim's is his idea of social integration. Mead also stressed the social character of perception: our first encounters are social.From these bases, Habermas develops his concept of communicative action: communicative action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge, in a process of achieving mutual understandings. It then coordinates action towards social integration and solidarity. Finally, communicative action is the process through which people form their identities.Society is integrated socially both through the actions of its members and systemically by the requirements of the economic/hierarchical/oppressive system in a way that tends to interpenetrate and overwhelm autonomous action orientations.[who?] This gives rise to a dual concept of modern society; the internal subjective viewpoint of the "lifeworld" and the external viewpoint of the "system".Following Weber again, an increasing complexity arises from the structural and institutional differentiation of the lifeworld, which follows the closed logic of the systemic rationalisation of our communications. There is a transfer of action co-ordination from 'language' over to 'steering media', such as money and power, which bypass consensus-oriented communication with a 'symbolic generalisation of rewards and punishments'. After this process the lifeworld "is no longer needed for the coordination of action". This results in humans ('lifeworld actors') losing a sense of responsibility with a chain of negative social consequences. Lifeworld communications lose their purpose becoming irrelevant for the coordination of central life processes. This has the effect of ripping the heart out of social discourse, allowing complex differentiation to occur but at the cost of social pathologies. "In the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration even in those areas where a consensus dependent co-ordination of action cannot be replaced, that is, where the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at stake. In these areas, the mediatization of the lifeworld assumes the form of colonisation". Habermas argues that Horkheimer and Adorno, like Weber before them, confused system rationality with action rationality. This prevented them from dissecting the effects of the intrusion of steering media into a differentiated lifeworld, and the rationalisation of action orientations that follows. They could then only identify spontaneous communicative actions within areas of apparently 'non-rational' action, art and love on the one hand or the charisma of the leader on the other, as having any value.According to Habermas, lifeworlds become colonised by steering media when four things happen:1. Traditional forms of life are dismantled.2. Social roles are sufficiently differentiated.3. There are adequate rewards of leisure and money for the alienated labour.
All You Need is LoveThe BeatlesLennon/McCartneyLove, love, love, love, love, love, love, love, love. There's nothing you can do that can't be done. Nothing you can sing that can't be sung. Nothing you can say but you can learn how to play the game It's easy. There's nothing you can make that can't be made. No one you can save that can't be saved. Nothing you can do but you can learn how to be you in time - It's easy.All you need is love, all you need is love, All you need is love, love, love is all you need. Love, love, love, love, love, love, love, love, love. All you need is love, all you need is love, All you need is love, love, love is all you need. There's nothing you can know that isn't known. Nothing you can see that isn't shown. Nowhere you can be that isn't where you're meant to be. It's easy. All you need is love, all you need is love, All you need is love, love, love is all you need. All you need is love (all together now) All you need is love (everybody) All you need is love, love, love is all you need.
- Hopes and dreams become individuated by state canalization of welfare and culture.